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Zacharias: Justice Brandeis and Railroad Accidents

JUSTICE BRANDEIS AND RAILROAD ACCIDENTS:
FAIRNESS, UNIFORMITY AND CONSISTENCY
Larry Zacharias*
I. INTRODUCTION
My interest in Brandeis began during law school: I was struck
by the extraordinary nature of his first sentences in the opinions we
read. Consider the opening of his opinion in Bd. of Trade of Chicago
v. United States:1
Chicago is the leading grain market in the world. Its
Board of Trade is the commercial center through
which most of the trading in grain is done.2
This wording was unusual as judicial opinions go, especially
for someone like Brandeis who was renowned for his objections to
“bigness.” Ironically, in Bd. of Trade of Chicago Brandeis became a
defender of bigness by adapting the “rule of reason” exception to
overt restraints of trade under the Sherman Act.3 His opening
sentences clearly signaled the exception.4
Ten years after my first encounter with Brandeis’ distinctive
style a law school fellowship afforded me the opportunity to examine
Brandeis’ framing techniques more systematically. In an article
entitled Reframing the Constitution: Brandeis, “Facts,” and the
Nation’s Deliberative Process, I described how Brandeis rendered
ordinary facts salient by placing them in the first sentences of his
opinions and how he then used those facts to frame the legal issues in

*Emeritus

Professor, University of Massachusetts-Amherst. My thanks to Bill Nelson and
the members of my panel, Steve Winter, Bob Pushaw and Rodger Citron.
1 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
2 Id. at 235.
3 Bd. of Trade of Chi., 246 U.S. at 235.
4 Id. at 238; David A. Ettinger & Gerard Mantese, The Rule of Reason, 64 MICH. B.J. 36,
36 (1985).
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the case.5 My article focused on Brandeis’ strategy in cases
involving judicial review under the Constitution.6 When Brandeis
joined the Court the central constitutional battle was the reallocation
of state and federal regulatory powers to manage the nationalizing of
industry.7 Brandeis’ first sentences at the time contextualized or
“reframed” these battles by tying the underlying social and economic
facts of each case to the deliberative process – that is, to give the
Court insight into the appropriateness, and so legitimacy, of state
versus federal power, and legislative versus administrative versus
judicial process for resolving the kind of regulatory problem at hand.
As I was sorting out his first sentences back in the 1980s, a
group of cases involving railroad accidents also caught my attention.8
In most of the railroad opinions Brandeis began with the name of the
victim and followed with a stylized fact recitation of the
circumstances surrounding the accident.9 It was another puzzle, but
one I left behind at the time. However, when Sam Levine asked me to
present a paper at the Louis D. Brandeis Conference at Touro College
– Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, I took it as an opportunity to
revisit those railroad cases.

5 This article was rejected in the 1980s by about sixty different law reviews, but an
Australian law review did finally publish it some thirty years later. See L.S. Zacharias,
Reframing the Constitution: Brandeis, “Facts,” and the Nation’s Deliberative Process, 20 J.
JURIS. 327 (2013) [hereinafter Zacharias, Reframing the Constitution]. However, a
companion piece on Brandeis and the regulation of the modern corporation that I wrote at
the time was published then – see L.S. Zacharias, Repaving the Brandeis Way: The Decline
of Developmental Property, 82 NW. U.L. REV. 596 (1988) [hereinafter Zacharias, Repaving
the Brandeis Way].
6 Zacharias, Reframing the Constitution, supra note 5, at 331.
7 Zacharias, Reframing the Constitution, supra note 5, at 329-30.
8 See, e.g., Swinson v. Chi., St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry. Co., 294 U.S. 529
(1935); W. & Atl. R.R. v. Hughes, 278 U.S. 496 (1929); Mich. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Mix, 278
U.S. 492 (1929); Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Wells-Dickey Tr. Co., 275 U.S. 161
(1927); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wells, 265 U.S. 101 (1924); Yazoo & Miss.
Valley R.R. Co. v. Mullins, 249 U.S. 531 (1919); New Orleans & Ne. R.R. Co. v. Scarlet,
249 U.S. 528 (1919); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Laughlin, 247 U.S. 204 (1918); Louisville &
Nashville R.R. Co. v. Holloway, 246 U.S. 525 (1918); Nelson v. S. Ry. Co., 246 U.S. 253
(1918); Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Whitacre, 242 U.S. 169 (1916).
9 See, e.g., Swinson, 294 U.S. at 530; Hughes, 278 U.S. at 497; Scarlet, 249 U.S. at 529;
Nelson, 246 U.S. at 254.
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II. FIRST SENTENCES AND THE FRAMING OF RAILROAD WORKER’S
ACCIDENT LITIGATION
Brandeis had a lifelong intimate relationship with the
American railroad industry, both its operations and its regulation.10
Curiously, one of the areas of railroad regulation Brandeis apparently
had little to do with, neither in his private practice nor in his public
service, was the field of railroad accidents, which included the
compensation and protection of railroad workers from accidental
deaths and injuries.11 Most, though not all, of the cases in my series

10 His famous turn to public advocacy and service was said to begin around the time of the
Homestead Strike in 1892 and the Pullman Strike two years later, although Melvin Urofsky
has downplayed the connection between those events and Brandeis’ conversion. See MELVIN
UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 83-97 (2009). At any rate, beginning in 1896
Brandeis became involved in a decade-long battle to improve the franchising of Boston
traction and transit companies. He then fought against J.P. Morgan and his railroad czar,
Charles Mellen, over their merger of the New Haven Railroad with Boston & Maine starting
in 1907. Louis D. Brandeis Versus the New Haven Railroad, Part I, BRANDEIS & HARLAN
WATCH (Apr. 8, 2016), https://brandeiswatch.wordpress.com/2016/04/08/louis-d-brandeisversus-the-new-haven-railroad-part-i/#comments.
Later still, in 1910-1913, Brandeis worked closely with shippers and the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) itself during the ICC’s hearings over shipping rates, known as
the “Eastern Rate” and “Advanced Rate” cases. Zacharias, Repaving the Brandeis Way,
supra note 5, at 608-612.). Along the way, Brandeis wrote two monographs on these issues,
along with several articles and chapters. See generally LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, BUSINESS – A
PROFESSION (1933); LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS
USE IT (1914). He was not single-mindedly against the railroads or their managers, as some
historians have suggested. see, Zacharias, Repaving the Brandeis Way, supra note 5, at 608610. Indeed, in becoming familiar with all the details of railroad operations and finances, he
even invested in their bonds, including in some railroad firms in whose cases he wrote
opinions for the Court. See The Louis Dembitz Brandeis Papers 1870-1941 (1979),
microformed on reel no. 142 (Univ. of Louisville) [hereinafter LDB Private Papers]. And
after having spent much of his public career opposing the railroads’ privileges, he seemed to
become nostalgic and take pity on that great American institution. His opinion in Nashville,
Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway v. Walters was a masterful defense of a railroad against an
unconstitutional taking when the Tennessee highway commissioner sought to tax the railroad
for road improvements that served highway traffic – that is, automobiles and trucks – but
undercut the railroad’s own business. 294 U.S. 405, 412-13 (1935).
11 He was involved occasionally in the more general field of industrial accidents. See
Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Joseph David Beck (Oct. 12, 1908), in 2 LETTERS OF LOUIS
D. BRANDEIS, (1907-1912): PEOPLE’S ATTORNEY 209 (Melvin I. Urofsky & David W. Levy
eds., 1972) [hereinafter 2 LETTERS]; Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alfred Brandeis (Oct.
12, 1908), in 2 LETTERS, supra note 11, at 209; Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Fredrick
Howard Gibson (Feb. 21, 1910), in 2 LETTERS, supra note 11, at 319; Letter from Louis D.
Brandeis to Industrial Insurance Committee, Wisconsin State Legislature (June 27, 1910), in
2 LETTERS, supra note 11, at 359-60; Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to J. M. Neenan (Mar.
11, 1912), in 2 LETTERS, supra note 11, at 566-67.
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here involve the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) of 1908.12
And though I did not notice it at first, once I finished compiling my
list of cases I realized that the series led inexorably to Erie v.
Tompkins,13 Brandeis’ last decision involving a railroad accident.14
Before turning to some data underlying these cases and their
background, please consider the opening sentences in Brandeis’ first
and last railroad accident opinions, penned twenty-two years apart:
Whitacre, a freight train brakeman, while walking
through a railroad yard on a dark and foggy night, fell
into a water cinder pit and was seriously injured.15
(1916)
Tompkins, a citizen of Pennsylvania, was injured on a
dark night by a passing freight train of the Erie
Railroad Company while walking along its right of
way at Hughestown in that state.16 (1938)

12 45 U.S.C.S. §§ 51-60 (LEXIS through PL 114-254) [hereinafter FELA, including
instances that should read “The FELA”].
13 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
14 Id. at 69 (stating Erie did not involve FELA, but was an accident involving a third-party
bystander walking along the tracks).
Prior to the Louis D. Brandeis conference, I had circulated a draft of this paper to the
other participants on my panel. Shortly before the conference we conferred about the panel
by phone. Steve Winter recommended that I look at Ed Purcell’s book on Brandeis and Erie.
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE
JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY
AMERICA (2000). I responded that I had already purchased a copy, but had difficulty getting
past the beginning. “So did I,” said Steve, “but I pushed past it, and it’s quite a brilliant
book.” So, I too, pushed past and concur with Steve – it is brilliant. The central difference
between Purcell’s book and this paper, apart from the scope of the inquiry (Purcell’s being
far more ambitious than mine here), is our respective starting points. Purcell, essentially,
unpacks the Erie decision (including the three opinions) and traces back the path, or
provenance, of Erie’s major concerns and issues historically: the role of the railroads in
American litigation, the growth and place of the federal or general common law in American
constitutional doctrine, forum shopping, diversity jurisdiction, the regulatory authority of
federal courts, and so forth. The book’s brilliance is in the map Purcell furnishes his readers
of all these intersecting paths leading up to Erie. In contrast, when I began this paper, I did
not even have Erie in mind; my interest was solely in making sense of Brandeis’ style of
writing in the first sentences of his railroad accident opinions, in particular those involving
railroad workers. That it led me to many of the same interpretations and conclusions as
Purcell was largely happenstance. In that sense, my story is a supplement to Purcell’s; it
offers a different kind of evidence of Brandeis’ intentions leading up to Erie. Still, for a
more robust account of the different themes embedded in Erie and Brandeis’ relation to
them, the reader should consult Purcell’s book.
15 Whitacre, 242 U.S. at 170.
16 Erie, 304 U.S. at 69.
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You may be questioning my use of Erie v. Tompkins in the
example above. But Brandeis’ iconic opening headline in Erie –
“The question for decision is whether the oft-challenged doctrine of
Swift v. Tyson17 shall now be disapproved” – was a sentence he only
added in later drafts, most likely after he had secured a majority for
his point of view.18 Initially, he began his opinion as he did almost
all his other railroad accident opinions - with the name of the victim
followed by additional facts.19
It is readily apparent that the two opening sentences from
Whitacre and Erie are strikingly similar – a name, followed by a key
characterization of the person, followed by the treacherous
circumstances (e.g., darkness) of the injury. These two openings are
also similar to those in most of Brandeis’ other FELA opinions,
although most of the other opinions follow an even tighter script.20
During his tenure, Brandeis wrote fourteen FELA opinions
for the Court – not including his dissent in N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v.
Winfield.21 Of these, all but three begin with the name of the victim
followed by some facts salient to the decision.22 There were also
three other, non-FELA majority opinions, including Erie, that began
17

41 U.S. 1 (1842), overruled by Erie, 304 U.S. 64 (citation omitted) (the Court’s actual
footnote is omitted here; it reviews the century-long judicial controversy over Swift v.
Tyson).
18 Erie, 304 U.S. at 69. In his first handwritten draft of the Erie opinion, Brandeis wrote
as follows: “Tompkins, a citizen of Pennsylvania, was struck by a freight train of the Erie
Railroad while walking on its property at Hughestown in that State.” Louis D. Brandeis
Papers, microformed on reel no. 28, pp. 0001-0344 [hereinafter LDB Court Papers]. He then
amended the introduction by hand to: “Tompkins, a citizen of Pennsylvania, was struck on a
dark night by a freight train of the Erie Railroad Company while walking on its right of way
at Hughestown in that State.” Id. The handwritten draft was then typed and further amended
to read as follows: “Tompkins, a citizen of Pennsylvania, was injured on a dark night by a
passing freight train of the Erie Railroad Company while walking along its right of way at
Hughestown in that State.” Id. In the fifth draft, typewritten, Brandeis inserted the following
sentence by hand at the start: “The question for decision is whether the oft-challenged
doctrine of Swift v. Tyson shall now be disapproved.” Id. There followed another ten or so
drafts, but the first two sentences of the opinion remained as in the fifth typewritten draft,
above. See also PURCELL, supra note 14, at 105-06 (indicating that Brandeis already had his
majority when he began drafting).
19 Erie, 304 U.S. at 69.
20 See, e.g., Mix, 278 U.S. at 493; Wells-Dickey Tr. Co., 275 U.S. at 161-62; Wells, 265
U.S. at 102.
21 244 U.S. 147, 154-70 (1917) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
22 See Swinson, 294 U.S. at 530-31; Hughes, 278 U.S. at 497; Mix, 278 U.S. at 493-94;
Wells-Dickey Tr. Co., 275 U.S. at 161-62; Wells, 265 U.S. at 102-03; Mullins, 249 U.S. at
531-32; Scarlet, 249 U.S. at 529; Laughlin, 247 U.S. at 204-05; Holloway, 246 U.S. at 526;
Nelson, 246 U.S. at 254-55; Whitacre, 242 U.S. at 170.
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with the victim’s name;23 these three all involved railroad accidents.24
Finally, there were three FELA opinions that did not begin with the
victim’s name.25
Before we discuss FELA itself – its background and passage –
let’s consider the specific character of seven of the first sentences
from this series of opinions that are distinctively similar:
Holloway, a locomotive engineer, was killed on the
Louisville and Nashville Railroad while engaged in
the performance of his duties.26 (1918)
Xedes, a section hand on the Union Pacific Railroad,
was injured, in Kansas, while in the performance of
his duties.27 (1918)
Mullins, a flagman on the Yazoo & Mississippi Valley
Railroad, was injured while engaged in switching an
interstate train.28 (1919)
Wells, a citizen and resident of Colorado employed by
the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company,
was injured while performing his duties in New
Mexico.29 (1924)
Anderson was killed instantly while employed in
interstate commerce by the Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy Railroad.30 (1927)
Thomas Doyle, a switchman employed by the
Michigan Central Railroad, was killed in Michigan in
the performance of his duties.31 (1929)
23 Erie, 304 U.S. at 69; Gay v. Ruff, 292 U.S. 25, 27 (1934); Pan. R.R. Co. v. Toppin, 252
U.S. 308, 309 (1920). In addition, one dissenting opinion also begins with the name of the
victim, “Knudsen”: though the case does not fit directly into the line of decisions I am
discussing here, it raises some interesting tangential issues, insofar as the case addressed the
proper role of federal courts in federal administrative processes governing workers’
compensation – namely, the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. See
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 65-95 (1932) (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
24 Erie, 304 U.S. at 69; Gay, 292 U.S. at 27; Toppin, 252 U.S. at 309.
25 McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230, 230 (1934); Hoffman v. Missouri
ex rel. Foraker, 274 U.S. 21, 21 (1927); Lee v. Cent. of Ga. Ry. Co., 252 U.S. 109, 109
(1920).
26 Holloway, 246 U.S. at 526.
27 Laughlin, 247 U.S. at 204.
28 Mullins, 249 U.S. at 531.
29 Wells, 265 U.S. at 102.
30 Wells-Dickey Tr. Co., 275 U.S. at 161-62.
31 Mix, 278 U.S. at 493.
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Ira L. Hughes, a traveling fireman, was killed on the
Western & Atlantic Railroad while engaged in the
performance of his duties.32 (1929)
One other case began similarly – there is hardly sufficient variation to
designate it as inconsistent with the preceding introductions:
Scarlet was a fireman on the New Orleans &
Northeastern Railroad.
While engaged in the
performance of his duties he was injured by being
thrown down between the engine and the tender.33
(1919)
Even though the introduction to all of these cases is
consistent34 – the victim’s name, his function as an employee of the
railroad, that he was injured while performing his duties, and that the
injury occurred in interstate commerce – minor differences also
provide clues about the salient facts in the case.35 Indeed, despite the
similarity of these introductory sentences, the content and legal issues
in these cases differed broadly. One salient fact that all eight cases
did share, yet not mentioned in the first sentence, was that the victim
filed suit in state court.36

32

Hughes, 278 U.S. at 497.
Scarlet, 249 U.S. at 529.
34 During the breaks, in private conversations, Conference participants offered alternative
explanations for the consistency. Judith McMorrow, for instance, suggested that Brandeis
began with the names to put identifiable faces on the carnage of American industrial
accidents, much like a listing of the fallen at war memorial services. Judith McMorrow,
Brandeis and Lawyering (II), Address at Touro Law Center for a Conference on Louis D.
Brandeis (Mar. 31, 2016). Yet, in other opinions involving accident victims, Brandeis did
not begin with a name – see, e.g., infra notes 93-98. For example, his opinions for the Court
in Workmen’s Compensation Law (WCL) cases – see, e.g., Bradford Elec. Light Co. v.
Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932); Ohio v. Chattanooga Boiler & Tank Co., 289 U.S. 439
(1933); or his opinions under the Federal Control Act – see, e.g., Alabama & Vicksburg Ry.
Co. v. Journey, 257 U.S. 111 (1921). Joel Goldstein suggested that the configuration of facts
in the first sentence might have laid a basis for jurisdiction, but jurisdiction was rarely at
issue in these cases, and in the cases where it was, Brandeis tended to begin his opinion with
the jurisdictional facts. See, e.g., infra notes 201-210.
35 For instance, Brandeis noted in the Wells-Dickey Tr. Co. opening that the victim was
“killed instantly” and this subsequently played a part in denying the plaintiff’s claim for
damages for pain and suffering. See Wells-Dickey Tr. Co., 275 U.S. at 161-64. In some of
the other cases, the plaintiff’s place of residency or the site of the accident figures in the
outcome – e.g., whether the trial court had jurisdiction. See, e.g., Mix, 278 U.S. at 493-95.
36 Hughes, 278 U.S. at 497; Mix, 278 U.S. at 493; Wells-Dickey Tr. Co., 275 U.S. at 162;
Wells, 265 U.S. at 102; Mullins, 249 U.S. at 531; Scarlet, 249 U.S. at 529; Holloway, 246
U.S. at 526; Laughlin, 247 U.S. at 205.
33
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As I demonstrated in my earlier article, Brandeis drew on
facts of the case to frame the issues, and in general he included the
most salient facts in the first sentence of his opinions.37 The stylized
presentation of certain facts in FELA and related cases strongly
suggests that he was signaling something. But what, exactly, was
going on? How can we account for the formulaic, almost ritual
nature of these sentences? To unlock the mystery will require that we
come to grips first with the context in which Brandeis was framing
these cases, in particular, ongoing issues surrounding FELA.
III. THE FEDERAL EMPLOYER’S LIABILITY ACTS OF 1906 AND 1908
Congress passed FELA in 1906,38 but in January of 1908 the
Supreme Court overturned the law, 5-4, primarily because it was not
strictly limited to matters within Congress’ powers under the
Constitution’s interstate commerce clause.39 Three months later, in
April of 1908, Congress passed essentially the same Act with some
“improvements” and sufficient modifications of the interstate
commerce language to pass the Supreme Court’s test.40
37

See Zacharias, Reframing the Constitution, supra note 5, at 359.
John Fabian Witt, Federal Employers’ Liability Act (1908), ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM (2004)
http://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/federalemployers-liability-act-1908.
39 Howard v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. (Employers’ Liability Cases), 207 U.S. 463, 498-99, 504
(1908) (the majority, opinion by White, J., over-reached. The cases under consideration
admittedly involved injuries in interstate commerce, and the defendant railroads were both
interstate carriers. So, the Court could have disregarded the question of the statute’s
constitutionality and reserved it for an occasion on which the injury was not clearly within
Congress’ power to regulate. Yet, the Court determined that the language of the Act was
such that the interstate and intrastate cases could not be treated separately. The Court’s
opinion also raised other issues regarding Congressional power over state common law
doctrine and the Court made it clear that the majority disfavored federal intervention
altogether in this realm. The four justices in the minority – Moody, McKenna, Harlan, and
Holmes – published three separate opinions).
40 Mondou v. N.Y., New Haven, & Hartford R. R. Co. (Second Employers’ Liability
Cases), 223 U.S. 1, 53 (1912); see Howard, 207 U.S. at 541 (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(observing that “[t]he phrase ‘every common carrier engaged in trade or commerce’ may be
construed to mean ‘while engaged in trade or commerce’ without violence to the habits of
English speech . . . . ”). Congress adopted the language in Justice Holmes’ dissent and
amended the Act to “common carrier . . . while engaging in commerce between the several
states . . . . ” 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1908).
Congress sharpened the negligence and fellow-servant provisions and extended the time
to sue from one to two years from the day the cause of action accrued. Mondou, 223 U.S at
6, 49. Congress also broadened the provision, regarding contributory negligence, in which
the earlier act had barred recovery except “where [the victim’s] contributory negligence was
38
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FELA was an awkward compromise.41 On the one hand, it
was not a workmen’s compensation law that guaranteed all railroad
accident victims compensation. Essentially, it modified the common
law rules applied in railroad workers’ injury and wrongful death suits
against their employers, but only for accidents that had occurred in
interstate commerce.42 Railroads had long enjoyed exemptions from
liability to their injured and dead employees, insofar as victims had to
demonstrate the railroad’s fault in court and the railroad could plead
the fellow-servant, assumption of risk, or contributory negligence
defenses, except in states where legislatures had limited the
application of such defenses.43 To address the festering injustice of
the common-law tort system, Congress largely eradicated the
defenses in these cases, but employees still had to prove the railroad’s
fault (generally, negligence), something they would not have to do
under most states’ workmen’s compensation laws.44

slight and that of the employer was gross in comparison.” Lester P. Schoene & Frank
Watson, Workmen’s Compensation on Interstate Railways, 47 HARV. L. REV. 389, 392
(1934). H.R. REP. NO. 60-1386, at 3-4. In 1908 Congress decreed that “the fact that the
employee may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, but the
damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence
attributable to such employee.” Id. at 4. Congress also barred the contributory negligence
defense whenever the injury was caused in part by a violation of a safety statute aiming to
protect workers. Id. at 2, 6; Schoene & Watson, supra note 40, at 392. Congress barred
“assumption of risk” defenses in all FELA cases that involved a violation of any safety
statute. Id. at 6. Schoene & Watson, supra note 40, at 392. For an overview of the
amendments as well as their shortcomings, see Lester P. Schoene & Frank Watson,
Workmen;s Compensation on Interstate Railways, 47 HARV . L. REV. 389, 391-394.The
1906 law had been mute on this issue because the rule barring assumption of risk defenses
was applied pursuant to the Safety Appliance Act of 1893; but as of 1908, the ICC was
recommending further safety legislation and Congress was close to enacting the Federal
Boiler Inspection Act, passed in 1911. See C.T. Foster, Annotation, Employer’s Compliance
with Specific Legal Standard Prescribed by or Pursuant to Statute for Equipment, Structure,
or Material, as Defense to Charge of Negligence, 159 A.L.R. 870 (1946) (presuming the
expansion here anticipated subsequent federal safety legislation).
41 See Schoene & Watson, supra note 40, at 390.
42 See Schoene & Watson, supra note 40, at 392-98.
43 See Schoene & Watson, supra note 40, at 391-92.
44 The law disallowed certain tort defenses to claims of negligence. First, Congress
nullified the infamous fellow-servant doctrine very elegantly, by holding the railroad liable
to the victim for the negligent acts of its “officers, agents or employees”—thus turning what
had formerly been the railroad’s defense into the victim’s cause of action. Owens v. Union
Pac. R.R. Co., 319 U.S. 715, 720-21 (1943). Second, earlier federal railroad regulation, the
Safety Appliance Act of 1893, had required railroads to install safe equipment, in large part
to secure the safety of passengers; but section 8 of that Act also barred non-compliant
railroads from asserting “assumption of risk” defenses against suits by their injured
employees. See Act of Mar. 2, 1893, ch. 196, 27 Stat. 531, amended by The Safety
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By 1906, most states made some effort at tort reform in the
realm of industrial accidents, especially concerning the fellow servant
and assumption of risk doctrines.45 The more progressive states were
soon to introduce workers’ compensation laws that recognized the
inevitability of such accidents and ensured that all victims would be
compensated for their injuries, regardless of fault.46 At the same
time, workers’ compensation laws did not provide the levels of
compensation an employee could win in a successful tort suit –
damages for each kind of injury, such as loss of a limb or an eye,
were specified by statute or administrative boards; and the payments
to dependent beneficiaries for the death of an employee were often
relatively meager.47 In passing FELA, Congress had removed much
of the chanciness from employee tort suits and converted the
negligence of fellow servants from an employer defense into a cause
of action.48 Ultimately, railroad workers benefited from jury
largesse, and so resisted attempts by Congress to repeal FELA and
replace it with a more general compensation law for workers within

Appliance Act of Mar. 2, 1903, ch. 976, 32 Stat. 943. Section 8 of the original Act reads as
follows:
That any employee of any such common carrier who may be injured by
any locomotive, car, or train in use contrary to the provision of this act
shall not be deemed thereby to have assumed the risk thereby
occasioned, although continuing in the employment of such carrier after
the unlawful use of such locomotive, car, or train had been brought to his
knowledge.
Act of Mar. 2, 1893, ch. 196, 27 Stat. 532. FELA extended this principle to all federal safety
requirements. Third, FELA enabled employees who were contributorily negligent to sue
nevertheless for damages in proportion to their own and their employer’s relative negligence.
45 U.S.C.S. § 53 (LEXIS through PL 114-254). In such suits juries were instructed to
deduct that part of the damages attributable to the employee’s own negligence from the total
or, in other words, apportion the damages. Id. Fourth, the Act voided virtually all contract
provisions disclaiming the employer’s liability and all waivers of liability. Act of Mar. 2,
1893, ch. 196, 27 Stat. 532.
45 H.R. REP. NO. 60-1386, at 30-75 (1908) (compiling relevant state, territorial and federal
legislation). The Senate included a similar compilation during its hearings entitled “Laws
Regulating Liability of Employers for Injuries to Employees.” S. DOC. NO. 60-207 1-60
(1908).
46 See JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN,
DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 126 (2004); see also SAMUEL B.
HOROVITZ, INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION LAWS: HOROVITZ ON
WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION 153 (1944).
47 WITT, supra note 46, at 123.
48 FELA, supra note 12.
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its jurisdiction, such as those Congress established for the marine and
harbor industries.49
Why was FELA an “awkward” compromise in the larger
context of progressive legislation? A central constitutional problem
in the U.S. at the turn of the 20th century was the reallocation of state
and federal power to deal with the nationalization of industry and its
regulation.50 At the heart of the problem was the emergence of the
large corporation.51 The Supreme Court, at the time, took as its
assignment the supervision of that constitutional reallocation process,
and it did so largely under the rubric of the commerce clause and due
process clauses protecting liberty (as in “liberty of contract”) and
property – to wit, economic due process.52 Economic due process
served largely to limit state regulatory powers that presumably
interfered with overarching ideas about the proper functioning of a
national market, whereas the commerce clause served to smooth
supposed disruptions of that market at state borders.53
49

See HOROVITZ, supra note 46, at 152-53; see, e.g., John Williams-Searle, Risk,
Disability, and Citizenship: U.S. Railroaders and the Federal Employers’ Liability Act,
DISABILITY STUD. Q., (2008) http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/113/113 (discussing railroad
workers’ resistance to conventional insurance schemes such as those initiated under workers’
compensation acts); see also Crowell, 285 U.S. at 72-73 (Brandeis, J. dissenting) (regarding
problems administering the federal Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation
Act).
50 See Zacharias, Reframing the Constitution, supra note 5, at 328-330.
51 See Zacharias, Repaving the Brandeis Way, supra note 5, at 610-11; see Allen Kaufman
& Lawrence Zacharias, From Trust to Contract: The Legal Language of Managerial
Ideology, 1920-1980, 66 BUS. HIST. REV. 523, 531-33 (1992); see also ALLEN KAUFMAN,
LAWRENCE ZACHARIAS & MARVIN KARSON, MANAGERS VS. OWNERS: THE STRUGGLE FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 11-20 (1995).
52 See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), abrogated by West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
53 See, M ORTON K ELLER , AMERICA’ S T HREE R EGIMES : A N EW P OLITICAL H ISTORY
(2007), at 158-59; and William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Elastic Commerce
Clause: A Political Theory of American Federalism, 47 V AN. L. REV. 1355, 1376-1385
(2007).
The notion of “smoothing” is linked to “dormant Commerce Clause”
jurisprudence—see, Id. at 367-68. It meant limiting or overturning state actions that
“interfered” with or burdened interstate commerce, such as protectionist state legislation
designed to secure business for a state’s producers and merchants against outside
competition. Id. at 568-69. It also meant striking down state actions that tended to reach
beyond a state’s borders, such as corporate regulations that impeded what a firm might do
outside the state. Abram F. Myers, Federal Regulation of Corporations Under the
Commerce Clause, 129 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 143, 143-44 (1927). State
actions that ran afoul of exclusive federal jurisdiction of interstate commerce, such as the
regulation of navigable waters, were also subject to restraints; interstate railroads posed
issues of this sort as well – e.g., when states in some way regulated railroad through-traffic
that was designated interstate). See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 94-100 (1824) (discussing
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One of FELA’s objectives, apart from achieving a measure of
social justice for railroad workers, was to promote a kind of
uniformity in the regulation of railroad accidents.54
Among
conservative justices, the idea of uniformity was a constitutionally
implicit smoothing device: it rested on the principle that the common
law was the central means for regulation of economic life and that
friction between state and federal regulatory power could be
smoothed by elaborating the common law in a uniform manner.55
Among other things, this meant that the Court had to take a leading
role in tamping down the diversity of state common law rules and, as
we shall see below, using the common law to negate disruptive state
statutes and administrative rulings.56
FELA fell awkwardly into this framework of uniformity and
the common law. Although it was a statute, rather than judicial
elaboration of the common law, it was passed specifically to modify
an acknowledged problem of common law diversity – namely the
different state standards for holding railroads accountable to their
workers.57 In both the Senate and House reports on their respective
FELA bills, the authors point to a compilation of state laws on the
subject of industrial accidents, including those that governed railroad
employee accidents occurring in interstate commerce.58 Generally
speaking, both houses of Congress sought to bring uniformity to the
system of tort rules, even though Congress was limited to regulating
only those accidents that occurred in interstate commerce;
furthermore, at least in the Senate, legislators wanted to establish a
minimum threshold for the railroads’ liability and their workers’
chances for restitution.59

the state regulation of waterways); see also S. Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20, 26-27
(1911) (speaking of the state regulation on railroad traffic). My point here is that the
Commerce Clause gave federal courts substantial power to restrict state action in varying
ways.
54 A Council Policy Paper: A Summary of Current Legislative Provisions Prescribing the
Legal and Regulatory Framework Governing The National Railroad Passenger Corporation
(Amtrak),
AMTRAK
REFORM
COUNCIL
1,
34
(Dec.
4,
2000),
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/arc/materials/legsum.pdf.
55 See William P. Murphy, Sidetracking the FELA: The Railroads’ Property Damage
Claims, 69 MINN. L. REV. 349, 372 n.99 (1985).
56 Id.
57 Id. at 372-74.
58 H.R. REP. NO. 60-1386, at 30-75 (1908); S. DOC. NO. 60-207, at 1-60 (1908).
59 See Thomas E. Baker, Why Congress Should Repeal the Federal Employers’ Liability
Act of 1908, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 79, 80-82 (1992).
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Although FELA was not progressive legislation in the sense
of expanding government power to address social injustice, it
nevertheless gave railroad workers a leg up in injury suits against
their employers and it did so by raising the common law rules to their
“highest” common denominator in terms of social justice.60
Conservative justices acknowledged that Congress was using its
legislative powers properly when it modified the common law in
small doses to smooth the disruptive effects of state common law
diversity; but those justices were also the jealous guardians of the
common law, and so they limited FELA’s modifications to what they
perceived the common law tradition to be.61 In doing so, they
appealed to the idea of “uniformity,” an idea that grew rife in the
early decades of the 20th century.62 This was precisely the paradox
that would play itself out in the Court’s Winfield decision. 63
In addition to the problem of state law diversity and the
absence of a uniform set of rules to regulate liability for the injuries
and deaths of railroad workers in interstate commerce, Congress also
had to address the similarly vexing problem of inconsistency.64

60 See id. at 83-84 (discussing how FELA made it easier for railway workmen to recover
in negligence actions against their employers by loosening common-law negligence
standards).
61 See, e.g., William Schofield, Uniformity of Law in the Several States as an American
Ideal, 21 HARV. L. REV. 510, 510, 519-26 (1908) [hereinafter Schofield, Uniformity of Law
I]. The American common law tradition, imported via Blackstone and elaborated by his
earlier American imitators, such as Zephaniah Swift and James Kent, projected the common
law as a unitary, seamless whole. ROSCOE P OUND, THE F ORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN
LAW 6-13 (1938). See generally, WILLIAM E. N ELSON , THE AMERICANIZATION OF THE
COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL C HANGE ON M ASSACHUSETTS S OCIETY , 17601830 (1975); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 17801860 (1977). LEGISLATIVE modifications, in the eyes of those who sought to preserve the
tradition, threatened to corrupt the unitary fabric; conservative judges accepted limited
statutory modification as the price of social progress and change, but hardly welcomed it.
Schofield, Uniformity of Law I, supra note 61, at 519-26.
62 See Winfield, 244 U.S 147. For a contemporary discussion of uniformity issues in the
law, see, e.g., William Schofield, Uniformity of Law in the Several States as an American
Ideal, 21 HARV. L. REV. 416 (1908) [hereinafter Schofield, Uniformity of Law II]; see also
William Schofield, Uniformity of Law in the Several States as an American Ideal, 21 HARV.
L. REV. 583 (1908) [hereinafter Schofield, Uniformity of Law III]. Consider also that the
State Boards of Commissioners for Promoting Uniformity of Legislation in the United States
were in their eighteenth year in 1908. Schofield, Uniformity of Law I, supra note 61, at 51819.
63 See Winfield, 244 U.S. 147.
64 See Schofield, Uniformity of Law I, supra note 61, at 510.
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Inconsistency was not a regulatory problem,65 but rather a procedural
one. To wit, the same case could be tried in a variety of different
fora, and in each the outcome might be different, not because the
different fora were applying different regulations or substantive rules,
but because their decision-making processes differed.66 Indeed, the
legal system is always prone to inconsistency: two judges may not
decide the same case alike; two different juries might give
contradictory verdicts.67 To address inconsistency of this sort, the
law searches for explicit ways to render the decision process
consistent.68 Even so, there will be opportunities for forum shopping
that capitalize on differences in decision processes.69 To some
degree, Congress addressed forum shopping by amending FELA in
1910, precluding the removal of suits initiated in state courts to
federal courts.70

65

This regulatory problem was embedded in the larger one involving corporate regulation
and the collapsing of state authority and the building up of a federal capacity to regulate the
corporation in interstate commerce. See Zacharias, Repaving the Brandeis Way, supra note
5, at 599; see also Zacharias, Reframing the Constitution, supra note 5, at 329.
66 See Daniel James, Law and the Modern Mind, by Jerome Frank, 6 IND. L. REV. 351, 351
(1931) (book review).
67 See Oscar Cox, Law and the Modern Mind, by Jerome Frank, 40 YALE L.J. 670, 670-72
(1931) (book review).
68 See Francis M. Burdick, Is Law the Expression of Class Selfishness? 25 HARV. L. REV.
349, 360-61 (1912) (discussing a conservative apology for the judiciary with respect to the
immunization of railroads from workers’ injury claims. On the one hand, he speaks to the
uniformity problem in addressing the fellow-servant doctrine as a reasonable, though
admittedly debatable, rule for regulating the railroads’ liability respecting their workers’
injury claims; on the other hand, he speaks to the consistency problem in highlighting the
judicial reasoning process, disclaiming class interest on the part of the judiciary insofar as
individual judges exhibited no railroad-favoring bias in their ongoing attempts to get the
accident regulation right); see also Schoene & Watson, supra note 40, at 410 (discussing
consistency under FELA).
69 Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV.
481, 483 (2011).
70 The 1910 Amendment to the 1908 Act, Section 6, reads as follows:
Under this Act an action may be brought in a circuit court of the United
States, in the district of the residence of the defendant, or in which the
cause of action arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing business
at the time of commencing such action. The jurisdiction of the courts of
the United States under this Act shall be concurrent with that of the
courts of the several States, and no case arising under this Act and
brought in any state court of competent jurisdiction shall be removed to
any court of the United States.
FELA, ch. 143, 36 Stat. 291 (1910) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. § 56 (2016))
(emphasis added).
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IV. JUSTICE BRANDEIS’ EARLIER ENCOUNTERS WITH FELA
Where did Brandeis stand on these issues – that is, social
justice, uniformity and consistency? The question will be easier to
address once we have reviewed his first three FELA opinions, his
opinions for the Court in Whitacre and Nelson, and his dissent in
Winfield.71
The Whitacre decision was a relatively simple one, disposed
of in three paragraphs.72 Whitacre, the victim, had fallen into an
unprotected and unlit railroad pit “on a dark and foggy night” while
at work.73 He sued in a Maryland state court under FELA.74 The
railroad, in its defense, claimed that there was no proof of negligence
and asked for a directed verdict, but the judge sent the case to the
jury.75 The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and, on appeal, the
Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.76 Brandeis, in reaffirming the Maryland court’s judgment, concluded, “[n]o clear and
palpable error is shown which would justify us in disturbing that
ruling.”77
The Whitacre case was only significant because it gave
Brandeis some insight into what was to follow: most of the FELA
litigation would be handled by state courts, especially because the
statute precluded removal once a case began in state court.78 Further,
the state courts’ handling of negligence trials differed from one
another and from the federal district courts with respect to evidentiary
standards and other procedures.79 Brandeis understood that victims
would still have to prove the railroads’ negligence, but in 1916 he
was apparently willing to let the state courts’ laxity on this point
71 Winfield, 244 U.S. at 148, 154-70 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (being brought under the
NY State Workmen’s Compensation Law, this was not technically a FELA case: the
defendant objected to the victim’s claim, arguing that FELA pre-empted the NY WCL in the
present suit).
72 Whitacre, 242 U.S. at 169-71.
73 Id. at 170.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 170-71.
76 Id.
77 Whitacre, 242 U.S. at 170-71.
78 Id.
79 The fact that the first sentence in Whitacre is somewhat different in style from those in
opinions that followed suggests that Brandeis developed his signaling strategy later,
probably in response to Winfield. Whitacre, 242 U.S. 169; see also PURCELL, supra note 14,
at 105.
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prevail, so long as they tried the issue of negligence.80 The Nelson
case no doubt buoyed Brandeis’ optimism that state appellate courts
would regulate the state judiciary adequately so that trial courts
would perform this obligation with consistency: that is, that trial
judges would in fact find negligence as FELA prescribed rather than
hand juries a carte blanche to award damages to plaintiffs regardless
of the underlying facts.
In Nelson, Nelson, a surveyor, stumbled on a rotting railroad
tie, fell through into a depression below the tie, and dislocated his
knee.81 Though the rot and the lack of ballast below the tie could
have been discovered, neither affected the safety of the railroad’s
operations, and both conditions were deemed ordinary hazards in
Nelson’s line of work.82 Nevertheless, the trial court sent the case to
the jury, and issued judgment upon the jury’s verdict for Nelson.83
The North Carolina Supreme Court, however, reversed the judgment
“on the ground that there was no evidence of negligence . . . .”84
Brandeis wrote in affirming the North Carolina court’s reversal, “[i]t
is clear that the defendant did not fail in any duty which it owed to
the plaintiff.”85
Between the Whitacre and Nelson cases, Brandeis penned his
first dissent as a Justice. In N.Y. Cent. Railroad Co. v. Winfield,86 the
Court confronted the issue of the law’s uniformity.87 Winfield lost an
eye through a no-fault accident, and because he could not sue
successfully under FELA, he filed a claim under New York State’s
Workmen’s Compensation Law (WCL).88 The majority, per Justice
Van Devanter, decided that FELA preempted the NY WCL, even

80

See Scarlet, 249 U.S. at 529-30; Mullins, 249 U.S. at 532-33; Hughes, 278 U.S. at 497.
Nelson, 246 U.S. at 254. Brandeis’ Nelson opinion began as follows: “Nelson a civil
engineer who had been in the employ of the Southern Railway eleven years, was directed to
make a survey in one of its yards.” Id. He then goes on to describe the circumstances
leading to the injury in the next three sentences. Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.at 255.
84 Nelson, 246 U.S. at 255
85 Id.
86 Winfield, 244 U.S. 147.
87 In Melvin Urofsky’s recent biography, Louis D. Brandeis: A Life, Urofsky’s book
spends two pages dissecting Brandeis’ first dissent, focusing for the most part on implicit
versus explicit federal preemption; unfortunately, he wholly misses the uniformity issue that
vexed Brandeis and his contemporaries, both on the Court and off. UROFSKY, supra note 10,
at 481-82.
88 Winfield, 244 U.S. at 148.
81
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though technically speaking, FELA did not explicitly give notice of
its preemptive scope and was mute on the subject of non-negligent or
no-fault accidents.89 Van Devanter, however, argued that Congress
had intended to preempt state laws governing all injuries to railroad
employees that occurred in interstate commerce.90 Drawing on
language in the House of Representatives and Senate Reports, he
claimed that Congress sought to construct a “national law having a
uniform operation throughout all the states.”91 Furthermore, he
opined, “Congress, in its discretion, acted upon the principle that
compensation should be exacted from the carrier where, and only
where, the injury results from negligence imputable to it.”92
The quest for uniformity is explicit only in the House
Report;93 the language of the more progressive Senate Report reads
as follows:94
An examination of the laws of the various States of the
Union will show that this measure brings the United
States in harmony with the prevailing spirit which has
actuated the law-making power throughout the
country. It is no part of the purpose of this legislation
to oppress or add burdens to the business enterprises
of the country, but rather to promote the welfare of

89

Id. at 152-54.
Id. at 149.
91 Id.at 150. Van Devanter’s opinion cites the reports of both houses for this proposition
(uniform national law), but it is noteworthy that only the House Report used such
language—see, infra notes 94-95.
92 Id.
93 H.R. REP. NO. 60-1386, at 1 (1908) (including two passages relating to uniformity:
“Many of the States have already changed the common-law rule in these particulars, and by
this bill it is hoped to fix a uniform rule of liability throughout the Union with reference to
the liability of common carriers to their employees.”) (emphasis added). The Report also
stated that:
A Federal statute of this character will supplant the numerous State
statutes on the subject so far as they relate to interstate commerce. It will
create uniformity throughout the Union, and the legal status of such
employer’s liability for personal injuries instead of being subject to
numerous rules will be fixed by one rule in all the States
Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
94 S. REP. NO. 60-460, at 8 (1908) (discussing the “[l]iability of [c]ommon carriers to their
employees.” The Report also anticipates broader remedies: “Undoubtedly, the time is
coming when a liberal scheme of compensation to injured employees will become general in
the United States, either under wise provisions of law or through the voluntary actions of our
great corporations.”).
90
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both employer and employee, by adjusting the losses
and injuries inseparable from industry and commerce
to the strength of those who in the nature of the case
ought to share the burden . . . . [T]he bill under
consideration, is not only within the constitutional
power of Congress, but a wise step toward the
establishment of justice and fair-dealing among men.95
Van Devanter was probably correct that Congress had intended to
preempt state laws then in force, but only insofar as they were
employer-favoring common-law rules.96 In 1908, when Congress
passed FELA, none of the states had yet adopted a no-fault
workmen’s compensation law.97 New York, in 1910, was the first to
do so.98 The diversity among the state laws in 1908 pertained only to
variations in the common-law, in particular the extent to which the
different states had declawed employer defenses in negligence suits. 99
Between the passage of FELA in 1908 and arguments on
Winfield in 1917, the landscape of industrial accident law changed
considerably, and Brandeis’ dissent tried to clear space out from
under FELA for the emerging state workmen’s compensation laws –
laws that in the eyes of progressives offered “a wise step toward” as
the Senate Report had put it, “the establishment of justice and fairdealing” in the realm of industrial accidents.100 Earlier in that term,
the Court had approved three states’ WCLs – New York’s, Iowa’s
and Washington’s – but in the latter case by only a 5-4 margin, with
Justice Van Devanter among the dissenters.101
Alexander Bickel’s The Unpublished Opinions of Mr. Justice
Brandeis reviews those WCL cases along with the Arizona
Employers’ Liability Cases, which involved a somewhat modified

95

Id. at 3-4.
Winfield, 244 U.S. at 150.
97 Id. at 165.
98 Id. at 158 n.5.
99 S. REP. NO. 60-460, at 1 (1908) (supporting the idea that legislators may only have been
seeking to unify the rules of decision in the federal courts (“courts of the United States”), but
the House Report resists this notion, as do the 1910 amendments to the Act).
100 Id. at 4.
On the changing landscape, see, M ARK ALDRICH, S AFETY F IRST:
TECHNOLOGY , L ABOR AND BUSINESS IN THE BUILDING OF WORK S AFETY , 1870-1939
(1997),
101 N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917); Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210
(1917); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917).
96
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workmen’s compensation law.102
Bickel concluded that the
conservative justices convinced themselves, case by case, that these
laws were acceptable only insofar as they preserved the spirit of
“liberty of contract.”103 The state legislature’s modifications of preexisting employment relations had to reflect balanced trade-offs.104
In other words, if the state allowed employees to recover for no-fault
accidents, then it had to protect employers from the kinds of large
damages juries routinely awarded in negligence suits.105 Insofar as
WCLs constrained all damages through fixed awards for specific
injuries and replaced juries with administrators or compensation
boards, the more conservative justices came to accept most of these
new laws.106 As Bickel showed, Brandeis learned to argue within
these parameters,107 even though he tended to side with Justice

102 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS: THE
SUPREME COURT AT WORK (1957). The Arizona Employers’ Liability Cases are at 250 U.S.
400 (1919).
103 Id. at 62-63, 65-67, 71-72, 75-76.
104 See Arthur Ballantine, A Compensation Plan for Railway Accident Claims, 29 HARV.
L. REV. 705, 708-09 (1916) (describing an instance of a balanced tradeoff amongst railway
worker’s employment relations in the railway industry).
105 Id. at 708-09, 711-13 (discussing trade-offs where Ballantine proposed an insurance
scheme that would render railways strictly liable as insurers for all third-party (i.e., nonworker) accident claims. He argued that the supposed right of an entrepreneur to be shielded
from no-fault claims is a soft one, compromised, for instance, by the strict liability rule of
respondeat superior; and he argued that the supposed rights of claimants to jury damage
awards – which would be the trade-off for ridding the system of fault—have similarly soft
foundations in the law); see also Arizona Employers’ Liability Cases, 250 U.S. 400, 431
(1919) (Holmes, J., concurring).
106 See Arizona Employers’ Liability Cases, 250 U.S. at 448-49 (McReynolds, J.,
dissenting) (showing a majority decision which follows several of the new laws).
107 According to Bickel’s account of the run-up to the Arizona Employers’ Liability Cases,
argued in January 1918, Chief Justice White was initially in the majority and assigned
Holmes the opinion of the Court. BICKEL, supra note 102, at 62, 64-65. In his draft, Holmes
argued that if a business is successful “the public pays its expenses and something more.”
Arizona Employers’ Liability Cases, 250 U.S. at 433 (Holmes, J., concurring). He
continued:
[i]t is reasonable the public should pay the whole cost of producing what
it wants and a part of that cost is the pain and mutilation incident to
production. By throwing that loss upon the employer in the first instance
we throw it upon the public in the long run and that is just.
Id. (Holmes, J., concurring). This principled approach did not wash with Justices Day and
Pitney, and so Brandeis tried his hand at an opinion, ultimately unpublished, that would
engage the more conservative members of the majority. BICKEL, supra note 102, at 67-68. In
the end, Justice Pitney wrote an opinion for the Court that drew on the kinds of arguments
Brandeis’ draft had suggested. Id.
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Holmes’ more expansive acceptance of no-fault compensation as the
fair way to treat the industrial carnage then current in America.108
As I noted, Brandeis was on relatively weak ground in
arguing that Congress, in 1908, did not intend to preempt state tort

108 Just how close Brandeis’ and Holmes’ views were on this point is not clear. On the
one hand, Brandeis favored an insurance scheme that would compensate workers injured or
killed on the job, but he also favored regulations that prevented accidents in addition to
compensating victims. WITT, supra note 46, at 150. This required workers and their unions
to collaborate with industry to keep the workplace safe, which in turn suggested some degree
of worker accountability. WITT, supra note 46, at 150. Even though Brandeis joined
Holmes’ concurrence in the Arizona Employers’ Liability Case, he nevertheless seemed
warier than Holmes of the kind of statute at issue in the Arizona case, namely one that gave
workers a right of election to go after a larger jury payout in cases in which they could prove
negligence. BICKEL, supra note 102, at 68-73. Ironically, Brandeis, though he disdained
forum shopping, defended the Arizona statute in his unpublished opinion on the basis,
among other things, that it gave plaintiffs a right of election much like forum shopping
which had been an ordinary part of the litigation landscape:
Such options commonly enjoyed by the plaintiff in a litigation, may be
likened to the option which he so frequently enjoys in selecting the
forum in which the controversy shall be conducted. A law which grants
to the one who institutes adversary proceedings, the right to determine
by which of several possible remedies the alleged claims shall be
determined, necessarily denies to the other party the choice of remedies.
BICKEL, supra note 102, at 73; see also Bradford Elec., 286 U.S. 145 (demonstrating that
Brandeis wrote a rather arbitrary opinion for the Court). The plaintiff had sued in New
Hampshire – the victim was killed there and the administratrix resided there – under a New
Hampshire WCL that gave the victim a right of election to make a no-fault claim under the
insurance provisions of the act or to sue in court for negligence (in the case at hand, she sued
for wrongful death). Bradford Elec., 286 U.S. at 150-51. The employer removed the case to
federal court and argued that Vermont’s WCL, which contained no right of election, but
simply defined benefits, governed. Id. The case could have been decided either way, but
Brandeis ruled in favor of the defendant, meaning that the Vermont WCL applied. Id. at 16163. His reasoning is uncharacteristically formalistic– to the effect that the victim had signed
on to the job in Vermont, at which point the Vermont WCL created a relationship between
the parties (employee and employer), and the fact that the victim was injured and died in
New Hampshire was merely incidental. Id. The better explanation here is that Brandeis was
simply not as tolerant of state variations as Holmes, and as in the Arizona case was willing to
conform the law as much as possible to a standard or uniform form of legislation.
Otherwise, he might have objected to the federal judiciary’s meddling with administrative
forms of WCL proceedings. See, e.g., Crowell, 285 U.S. 22. See also Letter from Louis D.
Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Nov. 13, 1927), in 5 LETTERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, (19211941): ELDER STATESMEN 309, 309-11 (Melvin I. Urofsky & David W. Levy eds., 1978)
[hereinafter 5 LETTERS] (stating that “Holmes J. is incorrigible when there is an opportunity
of curbing the power & province of a jury.” This statement was referring to Holmes’
opinion in Balt. & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927), a third-party railroad
accident case.). See also WITT, supra note 46, at 141 (explaining Holmes’ antipathy to juries
in these cases).
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laws on the subject of railroad employers’ liability. 109 Justice Van
Devanter; however, was perhaps on even weaker ground in asserting
that Congress had intended to keep no-fault compensation off the
books for interstate carriers.110 Accordingly, Brandeis’ opinion
focuses on the majority’s obsession with uniformity, arguing that the
absence of any preemptive language in the statute itself left room to
consider what the states had done since FELA’s passage in the area
of industrial accidents, and why.111 For instance, he offers evidence
that at the time FELA established its threshold standards for
employers’ liability no states had yet adopted WCLs;112 yet, in the
years since FELA’s passage thirty-seven states had enacted such
laws.113 Brandeis also counters the majority’s insistence on judicially
elaborated uniformity by showing how frequently the Court has had
to intercede to resolve the real lack of uniformity that had resulted
under FELA.114 In the preceding term, according to Brandeis, ninetythree of the Court’s 1,069 cases involved FELA: thirty-seven of those
cases involved the question whether the employee had been engaged
in interstate or intrastate commerce – that is, subject to different tort
rules depending on an evidently arbitrary distinction; and fifty-two of
those cases raised the question whether the employer’s negligence
had been proven, an issue that would not have been germane under
no-fault claims pursuant to a state’s WCL, such as the one at issue in
Winfield.115 In other words, if the goal of regulating the national
market was to establish a single rule for liability, then the Supreme
Court’s exclusive common law approach was failing.116 Furthermore,
as Brandeis makes clear, the Court’s insistence on uniformity
undercut the primary goal of FELA, to ensure fairness in industrial
accident cases, especially since a truer version of uniformity in that

109 Brandeis argued that by the time Congress intervened in 1906, and again in 1908, most
states had already eliminated the offending negligence defenses that railroads raised against
employee suits. See Winfield, 244 U.S. at 160-61 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
110 Id. at 150.
111 Id. at 163-64 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (stating that “[t]he scope of the act is so narrow
as to preclude the belief that thereby Congress intended to deny to the states the power to
provide compensation for relief of injuries not covered by it.”).
112 Id. at 165-66 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
113 Id. at 165 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
114 Winfield, 244 U.S. at 169 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
115 Id. at 168 n.11 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
116 Id. at 168 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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respect was already emerging through the adoption of WCLs by all
states.117
V. B ALANCING UNIFORM N ATIONAL REGULATION AGAINST CONSISTENT
J UDICIAL DECISION-M AKING

At this point it may be useful to review just where Brandeis
stood on the central issues of FELA legislation – fairness and social
justice, uniformity and consistency – and to ask how these positions
led him to focus his attention on consistency.
Above all, Brandeis held strongly to the belief that it was fair
to protect workers against industrial accidents and to compensate
them when accidents did occur.118 His 1912 letter to Mary Sumner119

117 Winfield, 244 U.S. at 160-61 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (stating that “the number of
accidents to railroad employees had become appalling” and before turn of the century state
legislative tort reforms improved the situation, employers compensated workers for less than
80% of all injuries. “In the year 1905-06 the number killed while on duty was 3,807, and the
number injured 55,524.”). See HOROVITZ, supra note 46, at 3-4. With respect to the state
WCLs, Brandeis acknowledged that they were unlikely to be uniform apart from their
general purposes:
The subject of compensation for accidents in industry is one peculiarly
appropriate for state legislation. There must, necessarily, be great
diversity in the conditions of living and in the needs of the injured and of
his dependents . . . . Though the principle that compensation should be
made, or relief given, is of universal application, the great diversity of
conditions in the different sections of the United States may, in a wise
application of the principle, call for differences between states . . . . The
[field] of compensation for injuries appears to be one in which
uniformity is not desirable, or at least not essential to the public welfare.
Winfield, 244 U.S. at 168-69 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
118 See Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Mary B. Sumner (Mar. 12, 1912), in 2 LETTERS,
supra note 11, at 567.
119 On March 12, 1912, Brandeis wrote Mary B. Sumner, a staff writer on The Survey, to
comment on a monograph about the German accident insurance system:
[First,] The social need for a comprehensive system for indemnifying
working men against industrial accidents is unquestioned . . . . [Second,]
An adequate system of accident insurance must tend to eliminate
preventable accidents as well as to compensate adequately for the loss
sustained. No system can be effective in preventing accidents which is
not of a nature to secure the fullest cooperation of employer and
employee; and none can be just which does not place the burden of
making compensation for accidents actually occurring jointly upon those
who jointly had the responsibility of preventing them. The responsibility
for the prevention of accidents, and the administration of the
compensation fund should be vested in a board composed of
representatives of both employer and employee.
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indicates that he believed producers had a responsibility to make
working environments safe and that workers should be compensated
for their injuries through insurance rather than by having to file
suit.120 Although Brandeis’ letter also suggests that in 1912 he
accepted the idea that companies should hold workers accountable
for their own acts, he nevertheless came to approve of the consistency
of the administered compensation schemes that emerged under both
state and federal workmen’s compensation legislation.121 He also
disdained the kinds of legal shenanigans both sides resorted to in tort
litigation to recover for accidental injuries and deaths.122 His dissent
in the Winfield case strongly signaled his inclinations in this realm of
regulation.123

Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Mary B. Sumner (Mar. 12, 1912), in 2 LETTERS, supra note
11, at 567.
120 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Mary B. Sumner (Mar. 12, 1912), in 2 LETTERS,
supra note 11, at 567.
121 Id. (stating “No system can be . . . just which does not place the burden of making
compensation for accidents actually occurring jointly upon those who jointly had the
responsibility of preventing them”). In addition to the earlier workmen’s compensation
cases, his comments in Crowell are worth noting. Crowell, 285 U.S. 22. Crowell began as a
claim for damages under the federal Longshoremen’s and Harbor Worker’s Compensation
Act. Id. at 36-37. The employer, Benson, contested the claimant Knudsen’s employment
status – i.e., that he was an independent contractor rather than an employee under the terms
of the act; however, the Deputy Commissioner, in an administrative hearing, found that
Knudsen was in fact covered under the act and issued an award in his favor. Id. at 36-37.
Benson then sought injunctive relief in the federal district court, which in turn granted him a
trial de novo. Id. at 37. The district court found that Knudsen had not been a covered
“employee” at the time of the accident and accordingly issued an order restraining
enforcement of the Deputy Commissioner’s award. Id. at 37. The Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the order. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 37. Brandeis, in a dissenting opinion, objected to
Benson’s resort to the district court as well as the latter court’s trial de novo:
No good reason is suggested why all the evidence which Benson
presented to the District Court in this cause could not have been
presented before the deputy commissioner; nor why he should have been
permitted to try his case provisionally before the administrative tribunal
and then to retry it in the District Court upon additional evidence
theretofore withheld. To permit him to do so violates the salutary
principle that administrative remedied must first be exhausted before
resorting to the court, imposes unnecessary and burdensome expense
upon the other party and cripples the effective administration of the act
. . . . [S]ince the advantage of prolonged litigation lies with the party able
to bear heavy expenses, the purpose of the act [i.e., cost effective,
reasoned and timely processing of injury claims] will be in part defeated.
Id. at 93-94.
122 See Mix, 278 U.S. 492.
123 See Winfield, 244 U.S. at 154 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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Brandeis’ views on uniformity dovetailed with his views on
the regulation of industrial accidents. He was, as his dissent in the
Winfield case shows, against the sort of knee-jerk uniformity that
infused the judiciary at the time.124 Judge Schofield’s amazingly
pedestrian article on Uniformity of Law in the Several States as an
American Ideal was symptomatic of contemporary conservative
views; Schofield places his faith in the common law and assigns to
the courts its guardianship and the unique role of ensuring its
uniformity. 125 In Winfield Brandeis had an opportunity to lash out at
this sort of thinking, to argue that the passage of a federal tort reform
statute for interstate railroad workers (i.e., FELA) ought not preclude
state workmen’s compensation laws, grounded on a no-fault liability
insurance scheme, from supplementing the federal law. The Court’s
conservative majority claimed that Congress’ desire for uniformity –
that is, one nation-wide standard based on common law principles
that precluded no-fault liability for interstate carriers – required the
exclusion of supplementary state workmen’s compensation remedies
from FELA cases: Brandeis, in his dissent, saw the majority’s claims
simply as an exercise in subjugating states’ authority to the
requirements of a federal judiciary in the name of uniformity.126

124

Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
This article was spread out over three issues of the Harvard Law Review in 1910. See
Schofield, Uniformity of Law I, supra note 61; Schofield, Uniformity of Law II, supra note
62; Schofield, Uniformity of Law III, supra note 62.
126 See Schofield, Uniformity of Law II, supra note 62, at 417, 430 (discussing the unitary
fabric of the common law and its corrosion under the pressure of legislative modification and
replacement). Consider Brandeis’ dissent in Olmstead. 277 U.S. 438. Chief Justice Taft,
writing for the Court, addressed the question whether “evidence obtained through
intercepting of telephone messages by government agents was inadmissible because the
mode of obtaining it was unethical, and a misdemeanor under the law of Washington.” Id. at
466. To answer the question Taft drew on the federal common law, which held
“admissibility of evidence is not affected by the illegality of the means by which it was
obtained.” Id. at 467. Taft acknowledged that many states had legislated exceptions to this
rule of evidence, but that the federal courts had no discretion to undercut the rule “[i]n the
absence of controlling legislation by Congress.” Id. at 468. Brandeis, in responding to the
same question on the laws of evidence, wrote: “Independently of the constitutional question,
I am of opinion that the judgment should be reversed. By the laws of Washington, wire
tapping is a crime.” Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 479 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). To this statement
he appended a footnote in which he cited the laws of 26 states that had criminalized the
interception of “a message sent by telegraph and/or telephone,” while also stating that 35
states had criminalized the disclosure or assistance in disclosure of any message by telegraph
or telephone companies, their employees or “persons conniving with them,” and three
federal acts to this effect (one for the territory of Alaska, the other two pertaining to
government transmissions and communications under the Radio Act. Id. at 479 n.13.
125
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At the same time, Brandeis was not against all forms of
uniformity. He supported the development of uniform state acts by
commission or other devices that demonstrated a forged consensus
around the solving of mutually experienced problems.127
Furthermore, he approved the sort of uniformity that tended to appear
among state laws when groundswells of popular opinion informed
one state legislature after another, as for instance in the case of state
workmen’s compensation legislation.128
One further point warrants mention regarding uniformity and
the FELA cases. The regulation of liability could not in fact be
uniform on a nationwide basis, because the evidentiary requirements
for negligence differed from state to state and between federal and
state courts.129 Insofar as FELA expressly forbade the litigants from
removing suits filed in state courts to federal courts, the locus for
shaping the law was going to be primarily in the state courts.130
127

See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. Hocking Valley Ry. Co., 243 U.S. 281 (1917). Also, Brandeis
was directly involved with the movement for uniform state laws from about 1900 to 1906,
sitting as a member of the Massachusetts committee of the “Commission on Uniformity of
Laws.” See Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to James Barr Ames (Dec. 28, 1900), in 1
LETTERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, (1870-1907): URBAN REFORMER 156 (Melvin I. Urofsky &
David W. Levy eds., 1971)[hereinafter 1 LETTERS ]; Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to James
Barr Ames (Feb. 6, 1905), in 1 LETTERS, supra note 127, at 280-81; Letter from Louis D.
Brandeis to William Lewis Douglas (July 24, 1905), in 1 LETTERS, supra note 127, at 347;
Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to William Lewis Douglas (Sept. 7, 1905), in 1 LETTERS,
supra note 127, at 359; Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to William Lewis Douglas (Oct. 21,
1905), in 1 LETTERS, supra note 127, at 364; Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Glendenning
B. Groesbeck (Oct. 31, 1905), in 1 LETTERS, supra note 127, at 366; Letter from Louis D.
Brandeis to William Lewis Douglas (Nov. 3, 1905), in 1 LETTERS, supra note 127, at 367;
Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Thomas E. Drake (Jan. 15, 1906), in 1 LETTERS, supra note
127, at 398; Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Curtis Guild, Jr. (Jan. 24, 1906), in 1 LETTERS,
supra note 127, at 401; Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Curtis Guild, Jr. (May 14, 1906), in
1 LETTERS, supra note 127, at 433; Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Curtis Guild, Jr. (May
14, 1906), in 1 LETTERS, supra note 127, at 434; Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Amasa
Mason Eaton (May 18, 1906), in 1 LETTERS, supra note 127, at 435.
128 In Winfield, Brandeis noted that 37 jurisdictions had already adopted WCLs: “Not one
of the thirty-seven states or territories which now have Workmen’s Compensation Laws had
introduced the system [i.e., in 1908].” Winfield, 244 U.S. at 165 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
As of 1944, 47 of 48 states had adopted such workers’ compensation legislation (Mississippi
was the sole outlier). HOROVITZ, supra note 46, at 7. See also, Zacharias, Reframing the
Constitution, supra note 5, at 334-36 (describing Brandeis’s support for the trend of
maximum hours legislation in 30 states to protect women).
129 See Erie, 304 U.S. 64.
130 See Kan. City S. Ry. Co. v. Leslie, 238 U.S. 599, 602 (1915) (holding that a plaintiff
bringing a case in state court in which it arose out of FELA cannot remove the case to any
court in the United States). Uniformity would have required the U.S. Supreme Court to hear
every aberrant negligence decision – i.e., aberrant from a federal evidentiary standard—from
the state courts, where most FELA suits were in fact filed.
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Indeed, I submit, Brandeis set out to redirect the Court’s
attention following Winfield away from the problem of uniformity
and toward the problem of consistency. The framing of his FELA
opinions, along with some other railroad accident cases, was at least
part of a long-term strategy to do so.131 The style of Brandeis’ first
sentences in FELA opinions was not uniform, but remained, as we
have seen, consistent for well over a decade.132 But given the
differences among those similarly styled cases – in particular, widely
different issues of law -- it will help to consider how Brandeis used
those differences to refashion the Court’s perspective on consistency.
Once he had spoken his mind about the Court’s misguided
obsession with uniformity in Winfield, Brandeis turned his attention
to the issues that Whitacre and Nelson raised.133 He focused on
setting parameters to ensure that the state courts applied consistent
processes, both in adjudicating Congress’ common law modifications
of negligence and in providing litigants – railroad workers as well as
the railroads – with fair and reasoned hearings.134 His concern for
consistency helps explain his seeming heartlessness in some FELA
cases – e.g., ruling against victims although he might have artfully
saved their judgments.135 To the extent that the federal statute
(FELA) provided the courts with explicit instructions (e.g., the
negligence requirement, the line of succession for dependent
survivors), he insisted that state courts enforce these.136 He
apparently believed that the courts should try negligence as a matter
of fact, and he was comfortable with giving juries a broad berth in
deciding a railroad’s liability; but he balked when judges, including
federal judges, imposed their own findings as matters of law,
131

The styling of Whitacre’s and Nelson’s first sentences is less refined, but by Holloway
the ritual consistency seems fixed; I believe that the strategy must have emerged following
the two earlier cases, along with Winfield. Unfortunately, we do not have the drafts of
Brandeis’ opinions written before 1920, so it is difficult to provide evidence of Brandeis’
strategic intentions with respect to framing and first sentences. We can trace the evolution of
his opening paragraphs for the later opinions, however, and we do so in context below. Still,
following the Whitacre and Nelson case openings – see supra notes 6 and 42 – the opening
sentences assume a constant form, both as to style and content, but they are by no means
“uniform.” See Whitacre, 242 U.S. at 170; Nelson, 246 U.S. at 254; Holloway, 246 U.S. at
526.
132 See, e.g., Whitacre, 242 U.S. 169; Nelson, 246 U.S. 253; Holloway, 246 U.S. 525.
133 See Whitacre, 242 U.S. 169; Nelson, 246 U.S. 253.
134 Whitacre, 242 U.S. at 170-71; see generally Nelson, 246 U.S. 253
135 See Nelson, 246 U.S. at 255.
136 See, e.g., Holloway, 246 U.S. at 528-29; Winfield, 244 U.S. at 168-70 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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regardless in whose favor the judges had ruled.137 Further, where
FELA was not explicit, he allowed state courts to apply their own
procedures and procedural rules – for instance, in the calculation of
damages for wrongful death or in managing attorneys’ fees.138
Brandeis also sought to develop consistency through jurisdictional
means. Despite the specific requirements of FELA, state procedural
variations offered forum shoppers their opportunities. Brandeis
reined in the effects of the more extreme state law variations; thus,
when he perceived that plaintiffs had filed suit in particular state
courts purely for litigation advantages, he imposed tight jurisdictional
restraints (e.g., insufficient contacts, burdens on interstate
commerce).139
In these ways, he did his utmost to render the litigation as
consistent as the language of his first sentences. And over the course
of two decades of FELA litigation he became increasingly confident
that the locus of the common law should be entirely in the states.140
He adopted his writing strategy following his frustration with the
Court in the Winfield case and he refined it over time as he heard
more FELA cases.141 The fact that he started three FELA opinions in
a different style, and that he began four non-FELA opinions – though
all involving railroad accidents – in a similar style can be explained
to some extent by the content of the cases.142 With regard to the latter
cases, I believe he must have noticed the overlapping problems of
other railroad accident cases, like Erie; and because this other tort
litigation was not bound by some of the restrictions on FELA cases –
i.e., FELA’s injunction against removing cases from state court and
FELA’s explicit statutory language modifying the common law that
prevailed over federal courts – he sought solutions to render that
other litigation consistent as well. Hence, we can come to grips with
his landmark decision overthrowing Swift v. Tyson-style common-law
uniformity in favor of high standards, or “consistency,” in the
decision-making processes of the state courts.143
137

See Winfield, 244 U.S. at 169 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Winfield, 244 U.S. at 168-69 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (discussing the issue of state
diversity in the context, of diversity among the WCLs).
139 See, e.g., Hoffman, 274 U.S. at 21-23.
140 See, e.g., Whitacre, 242 U.S. 169; Swinson, 294 U.S. 529.
141 See, e.g., Winfield, 244 U.S. at 154 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Hughes, 278 U.S. 496.
142 See Lee, 252 U.S. at 109; Hoffman, 274 U.S. at 21; McKnett, 292 U.S. at 230; Toppin,
252 U.S. at 309; Gay, 292 U.S. at 27; Erie, 304 U.S. at 69.
143 See Erie, 304 U.S. at 79.
138

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2017

27

Touro Law Review, Vol. 33, No. 1 [2017], Art. 5

78

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 33

VI. MANAGING CONSISTENCY IN STATE COURT FELA LITIGATION
Let’s turn finally to the opinions following Winfield. First,
the Scarlet,144 Mullins,145 and Hughes146 cases followed the path
Brandeis paved in Whitacre, his very first FELA opinion.147 In each
of these cases the defendant railroads claimed that the plaintiff had
failed to demonstrate negligence (Scarlet was seriously injured, the
other two killed on the job), and they challenged the trial courts’
evidentiary rules and jury instructions.148 In Whitacre’s case, as we
saw, Brandeis acquiesced in the state court’s requirements for finding
negligence, a low standard, apparently, that turned over the question
of negligence to a jury.149 In contrast, in Scarlet’s case, after the trial
judge had simply rendered a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff,
Brandeis, for the Court, reversed the judgment and remanded it for a
retrial on the negligence issue.150 In Mullins’s case, like Scarlet’s
case tried in a Mississippi state court, the record shows that the trial
judge applied the “Mississippi Prima Facie Act”151 -- in effect that the
burden of proof of negligence was met because res ipsa loquitur.152
When the judge had instructed the jury on negligence, he noted that
the defendant “has an absolute duty . . . to furnish the [plaintiff] with

144

Scarlet, 249 U.S. 528.
Mullins, 249 U.S. 531.
146
Hughes, 278 U.S. 496. The first draft of this case, handwritten, read as follows: “This
action, under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, was brought in a state court of Georgia
against the Western & Atlantic Railroad by the administratrix of a traveling fireman.
Hughes was killed while on the locomotive [“of a” – deleted] moving in interstate
commerce.” LDB Court Papers, supra note 10, at Pt. 1, Reel 46, p. 0317-0382. Brandeis
then inserted the phrase “while in the discharge of his duties” to the second sentence. LDB
Papers, supra note 10, at Pt. 1, Reel 46, p. 0317-0382 (emphasis added). He next changed
the subsequent typewritten draft by hand to read as follows: “Ira L. Hughes, a traveling
fireman, was killed on the Western & Atlantic Railroad while engaged in the performance of
his duties.” This became the published version, though the rest of the first paragraph
underwent further changes. LDB Court Papers, supra note 10, at Pt. 1, Reel 46, p. 03170382.
147 Whitacre, 242 U.S. 169.
148 See, e.g., Scarlet, 249 U.S. at 529-30; Mullins, 249 U.S. at 532; Hughes, 278 U.S. at
497. Roughly half of Brandeis’ FELA opinions involved questions about negligence – either
its definition or the evidentiary standard. As Brandeis had pointed out in his review of
FELA cases on the 1915 Supreme Court docket, about half had involved the same questions.
Winfield, 244 U.S. 147, 165-66 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
149 Whitacre, 242 U.S. at 170-71.
150 Scarlet, 249 U.S. at 529-30.
151 Mullins, 249 U.S. at 532-33.
152 Id. at 532.
145
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a safe place to perform the duties incident to his employment.”153
Here too Brandeis, for the Court, reversed the judgment and
remanded the case for a trial on the question of negligence.154
Finally, in Hughes’s case the trial court applied Georgia’s “scintilla
of evidence rule” in sending the case to successive juries, which
twice (the initial verdict was overturned and the case retried with a
different judge and jury) returned verdicts for the plaintiff.155 In this
case, Brandeis, for the Court, found that there was sufficient evidence
in the record to support the jury’s finding of negligence and
damages.156
Second, Brandeis also gave the states considerable discretion
in introducing procedural quirks into the management of their FELA
dockets so long as they abided by the explicit terms of the federal
statute.157 In Holloway’s case, the railroad challenged the state trial
court’s method in arriving at a death benefit for the widow.158
Brandeis, for the Court, affirmed the judgment, observing that the
“local rule of practice [on damages] . . . is a question of state law,
with which we have no concern.”159 The contrast no doubt had to do
with the fact that the statute (FELA) required proof of the carrier’s
negligence, but said nothing about methods for arriving at
damages.160 Accordingly, the Court insisted on something like a
federal standard for negligence, but was apparently content to let
state law govern or fill in the unelaborated details of the Act.161 This
distinction helps explain the outcomes in Xedes’162 and Anderson’s163
cases. The Xedes case is peculiar – suffice it to say that the Court

153

Id. at 533.
Id.
155 Hughes, 278 U.S. at 497.
156 Id. at 498. Responding to the opinion Brandeis circulated, Justice Butler wrote, “I
voted to reverse, but I acquiesce in the views of the majority as attractively put by you.”
LDB Court Papers, supra note 18, at Pt. 1, Reel 46, pp. 0317-0382. Similarly, Justice
McReynolds wrote: “I thought otherwise but do not care to say anything now.” Justice
Sutherland simply responded, “I yield.” LDB Court Papers, supra note 18, Pt. 1, Reel 46, pp.
0317-0382.
157 Holloway, 246 U.S. at 526, 529.
158 Id. at 527.
159 Id. at 528.
160 FELA, supra note 12.
161 Holloway, 246 U.S. at 528-29.
162 Laughlin, 247 U.S. 204.
163 Wells-Dickey Tr. Co., 275 U.S. 161.
154
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honored state procedural rules.164 Anderson’s case is harsh, but as in
the two Mississippi cases remanded for retrials, the outcome was
again dictated by the terms of the federal statute.165
Third, Brandeis was comfortable in exposing the defendant
railroads to the quirks of state law insofar as they were doing
business in the states where they were sued. However, insofar as
plaintiffs sought to take advantage of these quirks in states that had
little connection with the defendant or the cause of action, Brandeis
resisted.166 The last two cases in this series reflect his take on the
problem. Each was a forum shopping case gone bad. In Wells’s
case,167 the plaintiff, as Brandeis’ opening line indicates, was a
citizen of Colorado injured in New Mexico.168 He filed suit in a
164

Laughlin, 247 U.S. at 206-07. In Xedes’s case, the plaintiff’s lawyer, Laughlin, filed
suit in state court and at that time, in effect placed a lien to secure his fee on any judgment in
the case; he also provided notice of the lien to the railroad. Id. at 204-06. His client then got
a second lawyer who filed suit in federal court and won a settlement. Id. at 205. Laughlin
sued the railroad for his agreed upon fee (half of the award or settlement). Id. Brandeis, for
the Court, approved the Kansas lien procedure and found that the railroad had simply
“deforced” the lien in paying the settlement to the other attorney and his client. Id. at 206.
165 In Anderson’s case, the employee was killed instantly and was survived by his
dependent mother and sister. Wells-Dickey Tr. Co., 275 U.S. at 161-62. Before a suit was
brought the mother also died, so the trustee sued on behalf of the sister. Id. at 162. The
railroad challenged the verdict and judgment on the ground that the right of action under
FELA had died with the mother. Id. Brandeis, for the Court agreed: because Anderson died
instantly his heirs were not entitled to damages for his pain and suffering; and because the
statutory order for dependent survivors’ claims to support had vested the claim in the
mother, once she died there was no longer a claim for support. Id. at 163-64.
The drafting of the case proceeded as follows. The first handwritten draft read: “Elmer
E. Anderson, an employee of the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. was killed
while in interstate commerce.” Still in hand, Brandeis immediately changed this to:
“Anderson was killed while employed by the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. in
interstate commerce.”. Brandeis then placed the word “instantly” at the end of the sentence,
but thought better of it and moved it (with an arrow/caret) to follow the word “killed.” The
rest of the first paragraph draws substantial attention and redrafting, and the word “instantly”
seems to fall out and be replaced in the first sentence two or three more times (it ultimately
plays a large part in the decision, because instant death vitiated the survivors’ claims for the
victim’s pain and suffering). As the drafting process wound down, around draft eight or
nine, the order of the words “while employed by the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad
Co. in interstate commerce” becomes “while employed in interstate commerce by the
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co.,” the final version. Louis Dembitz Brandeis,
Court THE LOUIS DEMBITZ BRANDEIS PAPERS, Pt. 1, Reel 34, pp. 0709-0756, University of
Louisville, 1980.
166 Wells, 265 U.S. at 103.
167 Id. at 102.
168 Id. The initial handwritten draft begins as follows: “Wells, a citizen and resident of
Colorado, was an employee of the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company, an
interstate carrier. For injuries received while so employed in New Mexico, he sued the
company in a state court of Texas . . . .” LDB Court Papers , supra note 18, at Pt. 1, Reel 16,
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Texas state court, but because the defendant railroad had no presence
in Texas.169 Thereafter, Wells sued on a writ of garnishment against
another railroad that owed the actual defendant money and controlled
some of its rolling stock.170 The defendant did not appear, and the
state court entered a default judgment against it.171 The case then
took several turns before arriving at the Court, but in the end
Brandeis threw out the default judgment on the ground that forcing
the defendant to stand trial in Texas would have burdened interstate
commerce.172
The other case, Doyle’s case,173 involved even more overt
forum shopping motives.174 Doyle had been a resident of Michigan
when he was killed working there for a Michigan corporation whose

pp. 0789-0836. This introduction next changed in two stages to: “Wells, a citizen and
resident of Colorado, was an employee of the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway
Company, an interstate carrier. While performing his duties in New Mexico, he was injured.
He sued the company in a state court of Texas.” Then following another typed version of the
above, Brandeis inserted changes so that it read: “Wells, a citizen and resident of Colorado,
employed by the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company. [sic] He was injured
while performing his duties in New Mexico.” In the final version, Brandeis collapsed these
two sentences, so that they read: “Wells, a citizen and resident of Colorado, employed by the
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company, was injured while performing his duties in
New Mexico.” Louis Dembitz Brandeis, THE LOUIS DEMBITZ BRANDEIS COURT PAPERS, Pt.
1, Reel 16, pp. 0789-0836., University of Louisville, 1980.
169 Wells, 265 U.S. at 102.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 103. The garnishee objected to the writ, but was overruled; so, the defendant
appeared in a Texas federal District Court, suing to enjoin enforcement of the garnishment
and the district court dismissed the suit and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. at
102. Brandeis, for the Court, reversed the judgment because making the defendant stand
trial in Texas would have been a burden on interstate commerce and that the Texas state
court had incorrectly overruled the garnishee’s objection in the first place. Wells, 265 U.S. at
103.
173 Mix, 278 U.S. 492. Brandeis’ first draft began as follows: “Thomas Doyle, a citizen
and resident of Michigan employed there as switchman by the Michigan Central Railroad,
was injured in the performance of his duties at Lansing Michigan.” LDB Court Papers, supra
note 18, at Pt. 1, Reel 41, pp. 0466-0532. This next became: “Thomas Doyle, a switchman
employed by the Michigan Central Railroad, was killed in Michigan in the performance of
his duties,” which remained in the published opinion. LDB Court Papers, supra note 18, at
Pt. 1, Reel 41, pp. 0466-0532. Brandeis’ clerk raised the question why a court could not
assert jurisdiction if a state statute could authorize jurisdiction constitutionally; Brandeis and
the clerk debated the question in a series of handwritten memos, and Brandeis finally
concluded as he began, that a court could not assert jurisdiction under the circumstances.
174 Mix, 278 U.S. at 494-95 (discussing in Wells’ case that the victim had ultimately
resettled in Texas because he wanted to live there, and not apparently because it was
advantageous to sue there).
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business was largely confined to that state.175 Following Doyle’s
death, his surviving spouse relocated to Missouri, where she filed suit
under FELA and the Safety Appliance Act in a Missouri state
court.176 The defendant objected on the grounds that Missouri did not
have jurisdiction and, alternatively, that having to defend their placed
a burden on interstate commerce.177 Following some procedural
wrangling in the Missouri state and federal courts, the case reached
the Court.178 There, Brandeis, for the Court, wrote as follows:179
For aught that appears [the widow’s] removal to St.
Louis shortly after the accident was solely for the
purpose of bringing the suit, and because she was
advised that her chances of recovery would be better
there than they would be in Michigan. The mere fact
that she had acquired a residence within Missouri
before commencing the action does not make
reasonable the imposition . . . of the heavy burden
which would be entailed in trying the cause in a state
remote from that in which the accident occurred and in
which both parties resided at the time.180
Accordingly, the Court reversed the Missouri court’s judgment, in
effect dismissing the suit.181
To summarize these eight cases, Brandeis reinforced the
“uniformity” of the federal law only insofar as Congress had
explicitly laid down the rules for common law regulation – namely,
the negligence requirement and the line of succession in vesting
dependents’ survivor claims.182 Further, he allowed for a degree of
variation in state procedure, including evidentiary rules, but he
resisted plaintiffs’ attempts to seek trials in states that were unrelated
to the case itself – that is, cases that reeked of patent forum shopping
and, one might expect, more extreme departures from the ordinary
state rules of evidence and procedure governing negligence trials.
175

Mix, 278 U.S. at 493.
Id.
177 Id. at 494-95.
178 Id. at 494.
179 Id. at 495.
180 Mix, 278 U.S. at 495.
181 Id. at 496; see also John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936)
(Brandeis reversing an even more egregious forum shopping case).
182 Winfield, 244 U.S. at 162, 169 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
176
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Apart from the two earliest cases, Whitacre’s and Nelson’s, in
which Brandeis deviated somewhat from his introductory script,183
there was one other FELA opinion that begins with the victim’s
name:
Swinson, a freight brakeman in the employ of the
Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Railway,
brought this action under the Federal Employers’
Liability Act, in the federal District Court for
Minnesota.184
Although Brandeis did elaborate on the accident and injury in
his following sentences, his opening above differs from the others
because it does not call attention to the victim’s injury in the very
first sentence.185 More importantly, perhaps, it differs from the other
opening sentences in that it identifies where the victim filed suit – to
wit, in federal court.186 As in so many other FELA cases, the
defendant here claimed that the plaintiff had failed to prove
negligence and, further, that the plaintiff’s own misuse of the
equipment had given rise to the accident.187 The District Court
directed a verdict for the defendant, and the Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed.188 Brandeis reversed, on the ground that the equipment
had failed, which would have been a violation of the Safety
Appliance Act; and under FELA, such violations are evidence of
negligence.189 In Brandeis’ words, “[t]he Safety Appliance Act . . .
183

Whitacre, 242 U.S. at 170; Nelson, 246 U.S. at 254.Swinson, 294 U.S. at 530.
Id. (citation omitted).
185 The first handwritten draft is somewhat illegible, but the second and third drafts reflect
the following changes: “Swinson, a freight brakeman in the employ of the Chicago, St. Paul,
Minneapolis & Omaha Railway, brought in the federal court for Minnesota this action under
the Federal Employers’ Liability Act,” changed to “Swinson, a freight brakeman in the
employ of the Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Railway, brought this action under
the Federal Employers [sic] Liability Act in the federal court for Minnesota.” Draft 6
amends “Employers” in the title of the Act to “Employers’”; draft seven inserts the word
“the federal district court for Minnesota”; and draft eight amends the phrase to “a federal
district court in Minnesota.” Draft 9, finally, changes the phrase again, to “in the federal
district court for Minnesota.” When the justices responded to the circulated opinion, Butler
thought, “this goes too far, p. 2, but others being content, I shall not object.” McReynolds
also offered, “I shant object.” In contrast, Stone found it a “beautiful salient opinion.” Louis
Dembitz Brandeis, THE LOUIS DEMBITZ BRANDEIS COURT PAPERS, Pt. 2, Reel 15, pp. 06460693, University of Louisville, 1980.
186 Swinson, 294 U.S. at 530.
187 Id., at 530-31.
188 Id. at 531.
189 Id. at 531-32.
184
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has been liberally construed so as to give a right of recovery for every
injury the proximate cause of which was a failure to comply with a
requirement of the act.”190 Ironically, in order to achieve a degree of
consistency with the state court procedures that he channeled (i.e.,
jury trials on the question of negligence), here he was conforming the
federal court’s process and evidentiary standard to those of the state
courts.
My point here is that the Federal District Court and the
Circuit Court on appeal had taken a much more restrictive view of
plaintiff’s rights under FELA than the state courts took in most of the
other cases described so far. In that regard, there is nothing uniform
about the rules applied in such litigation against the railroads. So, it
is hardly surprising, that in the interest of greater consistency,
Brandeis was thinking about how to conform the ways federal courts
ruled in a given case to the way state courts might rule in the same
case.191
VII. BRIDGING THE GAP: FROM FELA TO ERIE
To continue, what can we learn from Brandeis’ three other
FELA opinions with different introductory styles, and also from his
three non-FELA opinions, all involving railroad accidents, that begin
with the name of the victim? Were FELA opinions which do not
begin with the victim’s name simply aberrations, stylistically, or did
Brandeis deliberately, so to speak, leave them out of the series?
The first of these cases is somewhat revealing; it
begins as follows:
An injured employee brought an action in a state court
of Georgia jointly against a railroad and its engineer
. . . .192
The problem was that the plaintiff was suing the railroad
under FELA and the engineer under Georgia tort law. 193 The two
defendants filed demurrers for misjoinder, but the trial court
overruled.194 On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the
190
191
192
193
194

Id. at 531.
Id.
Lee, 252 U.S. 109.
Id. at 109.
Id. at 109-10.
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joinder was not permissible, so the plaintiff appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court, citing his right to sue under FELA.195 Brandeis, for
the Court, held that Georgia state law governed procedure and that
the joining of suits, or not, was a matter of pleading and procedure.
Accordingly, he affirmed the state court’s ruling.196
On its face, this case seems to fit the profile of the other cases
in the series: Brandeis, writing for the Court, deferred to state law on
a procedural matter, and in that way undercut the notion that FELA
has established uniformity.197 At the same time, the case is peculiar.
When it reached the Supreme Court, there had not yet been a verdict;
and apart from the procedural question, no issues of accident law had
been addressed.198 Perhaps most significant, as we shall see with the
following two cases, the interlocutory nature of this appeal had not
yet produced a reliable statement of facts; given Brandeis’ meticulous
attention to the facts underlying his cases, the absence of facts about
the accident might have kept him from introducing this case as he had
the others.199 Instead, the principal facts that Brandeis had before
him were the procedural facts of the case.
The last two cases seem to follow this conclusion – that the
underlying facts of the case did not reach disposition before the
appeal arrived at the Supreme Court’s door.200 At the same time,
these two cases fit more closely with some of the other cases in the
series and their rulings. They begin as follows:
This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of
Missouri, which had granted, in an original
proceeding, a peremptory writ of mandamus. Its
195

Id. at 110.
Id. at 110-11 (elaborating on the conditions for the Court’s review of state procedural
rulings: to wit, only when matters nominally of procedure are actually matters of substance
that affect a federal right. He concluded by observing that the ruling here, as a procedural
matter, was appropriate, insofar as the railroad’s obligations to the plaintiff under FELA
differ from the engineer’s obligations under state tort law, and a single jury would have been
hard-pressed to separate them out in a joint trial).
197 Lee, 252 U.S. at 110.
198 Id. at 109-10.
199 Id. at 109. The drafts of the opinion are at Brandeis Court Papers, Pt. 1, Reel 2, pp
0053-0062. In his first handwritten draft, Brandeis began: “An injured employee brought
suit in a state court of Georgia jointly against a railroad and an [associate?] employee,” etc.
He then amended this draft, substituting “an action” for the word “suit” and also substituting
“its engineer” for the words “[associate] employee.” This was the opening sentence of the
published opinion.
200 Hoffman, 274 U.S. at 21; McKnett, 292 U.S. at 230.
196
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judgment directed the judge of an inferior court to set
aside a judgment dismissing an action and ordered him
to entertain jurisdiction. That action had been brought
under the [F]ederal Employers’ Liability Act by a
citizen and resident of Kansas . . . .201
This action was brought under the Federal Employers’
Liability Act, in the circuit court of Jefferson
[C]ounty, Ala[bama], to recover damages for an injury
suffered in Tennessee. The plaintiff, McKnett, is a
resident of Tennessee. The defendant, St. Louis &
San Francisco Railway Company, is a foreign
corporation doing business in Alabama. It pleaded in
abatement that the court lacked jurisdiction, since the
cause of action had arisen wholly in Tennessee and
did not arise by the common law or statute of that
state.202
The Foraker case (first one, above) came before the Court on an
interlocutory review.203 As in the Georgia case (Lee), there was no
verdict and the questions before the Court were procedural.204
Nevertheless, this case falls into the forum shopping category and
mirrors one of the other cases in the series, namely Doyle’s case.205
The McKnett case (second one, above), though not technically an
interlocutory appeal, had also not reached a verdict.206 Indeed, the
Alabama court had refused to hear the case on the grounds that a
cause of action under FELA was not one that had arisen in Alabama
or “by the common law or statute of another state,” as the Alabama
jurisdictional statute commanded.
What is interesting about both cases is that Brandeis sets some
parameters for state court jurisdiction in FELA cases. In the first
case he defends the state’s jurisdiction – that a trial there would not
impose a burden on interstate commerce;207 in the second case he
201

Hoffman, 274 U.S. at 21-22 (citations omitted).
McKnett, 292 U.S. at 230-31.
203 Hoffman, 274 U.S. at 21.
204 Lee, 252 U.S. at 109-10. The draft opinions for the Foraker case are at Brandeis Court
Papers, Pt. 2, Reel 29, pp. 0186-0222. There is no initial handwritten draft, and the printed
drafts begin as the published opinion does, with the words: “This is a writ of error to the
Supreme Court of Missouri,” etc.
205 Mix, 278 U.S. at 494.
206 McKnett, 292 U.S. at 231.
207 Hoffman, 274 U.S at 22-23.
202

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss1/5

36

Zacharias: Justice Brandeis and Railroad Accidents

2017 JUSTICE BRANDEIS AND RAILROAD ACCIDENTS

87

insists on the state’s jurisdiction – that Alabama courts cannot refuse
access to litigants who, but for the fact that the cause of action is
based on a federal statute, would otherwise be free to litigate in that
state’s courts.208 That he chose to treat these two cases differently in
style probably has to do with their interlocutory nature: that is to say,
their underlying facts were still awaiting disposition, and thereby he
felt compelled to begin with the procedural facts rather than assume
facts about the injury and related matters based on the pleadings.209
The remaining two opinions worth considering were nonFELA tort cases involving railroad accidents in which Brandeis
began with the victim’s name.210 In both of these cases, as in Erie,
the victim was a third-party bystander – that is, neither an employee
of the railroad, nor a passenger.211 The first of these opinions, like
Brandeis’ opening in the Bd. of Trade of Chicago case, is memorable
for the image it evokes:
Toppin was struck by a locomotive of the Panama
Railroad Company while riding a horse in the City of
Colon.212
At the same time, the case does fit squarely with what we
have said about the other cases in the series. The suit for negligence
was filed in the federal court of the territory, the Panama Canal Zone,
but the court applied the civil code of Colombia, which was the
received law of the Republic of Panama at the time because the injury
occurred in Colon, the capital of the Republic.213 The rule of
respondeat superior was at issue: did the engineer’s criminal
behavior exculpate the railroad?214 The civil code held not.215 The
defendant railroad objected to the choice of law, but on appeal
Brandeis affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff.216

208

McKnett, 292 U.S. at 233-34 (showing Brandeis’ insistence on the state court’s
accepting jurisdiction is premised in part on the “privileges and immunities clause” and in
part on the “full faith & credit clause.”).
209 Hoffman, 274 U.S. at 21-22; McKnett, 292 U.S. at 230-31.
210 Toppin, 252 U.S. at 309; Gay, 292 U.S. at 27.
211 Toppin, 252 U.S. at 309; Gay, 292 U.S. at 27.
212 Toppin, 252 U.S. at 309.
213 Id. at 309-10.
214 Id. at 309.
215 Id. at 310-11.
216 Id. at 309, 313.
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The other case, Ruff’s case,217 falls between the FELA cases
in the “first-name series” and the three FELA cases that Brandeis
began with procedural facts.218 To be sure, Ruff’s case involves the
competence of state courts where matters of federal law are at stake:
Ruff brought in a state court of Georgia this suit
against Gay, as receiver of the Savannah & Atlanta
Railway, appointed by the federal court for southern
Georgia sitting in equity. The cause of action alleged
is the homicide of plaintiff’s minor son as the result of
the negligent operation of a train by employees of the
receiver.219
In many ways, this was just another way station on the road to Erie.
In Ruff’s case, the federally appointed receiver of the bankrupt
railroad being sued tried to remove the proceedings from the Georgia
state court to a federal district court.220 He claimed that as a “federal
officer” he was entitled to have his case tried in federal court
pursuant to the federal Judicial Code.221 Brandeis, for his part, runs
out the history of the applicable provisions of the code and concludes
that they were not intended for occasions of this kind, but rather
occasions on which federal bill collectors and the like were apt to be
disfavored in state courts.222 This case, Brandeis goes on, falls more
in line with Congress’ intentions in the FELA:223
Congress had by the Federal Employers’ Liability Act
provided that suits for injuries resulting from
negligence in the operation of a railroad, although
arising under a federal statute, could be brought in a
state court, and if so brought could not be removed to
the federal court.224
So, this case too was a blow for consistency – the consistency of
maximizing state courts’ jurisdiction and the application of state law
rather than pursuing the white whale of “uniformity” by enabling
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224

Gay, 292 U.S. at 27.
Id. at 27-28.
Id. at 27.
Id.
Id.
Gay, 292 U.S. at 31-33.
Id. at 36.
Id.
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federal courts to conform state matters to unwritten rules of federal
common law.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The aim of this essay was not to revisit Erie, but rather to
show how Brandeis’ underlying concerns in Erie evolved over 20
years, particularly in the realm of deciding FELA cases along with
other railroad accident cases and employee compensation claims for
industrial accidents. Brandeis’ characteristic style in introducing so
many of these opinions – their framing – seems to indicate that
Brandeis had the intertwined problems of uniformity and consistency
in mind long before he arrived at Erie. Indeed, it seems as if a trio of
early opinions, including his dissent in the Winfield case, led him to
understand what he was trying to resolve as he grappled with state
and federal court jurisdiction and their respective rules of decision.
FELA provided him with a useful laboratory because most of the
cases came from state courts and were protected, by the terms of the
federal statute, from federal interventions that plagued so many other
progressive laws (viz., federal court injunctions disrupting
administrative proceedings and decisions). As he observed this rich
subject matter over the years, Brandeis gained confidence that the
administration of law by state courts, and not some unifying federal
common law, could best serve the nation. It was this confidence that
he used to win over a majority in Erie and that reflects itself in his
opinion for the Court.
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